TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/030590/0305510.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 9.4 KB | 217 lines

                                                                                INTERVIEW, Page 34

How the KGB Helps Gorbachev


OLEG GORDIEVSKY was once the KGB's station chief in London --
and Britain's most valued double agent. He fled to the West in
1985, just before he was to be executed. He believes the KGB
brought Mikhail Gorbachev to power and is busy keeping him
there

By FRANK MELVILLE and Oleg Gordievsky


    Q. If glasnost had happened sooner, would you still have
defected?

    A. I deliberately and purposefully had started to cooperate
with the British in order to help the security of Britain and
the West, the U.S. not least, and continued as a British agent
for years, and was prepared to continue for many more years,
even though I knew my situation was getting increasingly
dangerous. Then I was trapped by the KGB by a false excuse and
taken to Moscow, where I was drugged and interrogated. So in
my case, it was a long collaboration with the British, and then
a dramatic escape from the Soviet Union in 1985. Would I still
be an agent of the West today? Yes, even now I probably would,
because I am still not entirely convinced that democracy and
freedom will win in the Soviet Union. The main elements of the
totalitarian society in the Soviet Union remain. They are the
one-party state, the state-owned economy with one acceptable
ideology for the whole society, and the secret police.


    Q. Can you describe your escape from the Soviet Union?

    A. Not really, because there may be someone else who might
try the same means. I planned it for some time, in case of
danger. But even with careful planning it was an extremely
difficult and dangerous enterprise. When they took me back to
Moscow, I thought it was all over, I would die. They drugged
me, interrogated me, but then let me go, I don't know why,
though the KGB kept me under surveillance all the time. But I
managed to act on my escape plan -- despite some difficulties
and some encounters on the way to the border with the police
and the KGB -- and cross the border to the West, which was a
fantastic relief. I felt it was a miracle. I crossed the border
with my KGB identification card in my pocket. For some reason,
the KGB did not dismiss me after my interrogation, so I was
still in its employ when I escaped, though I had been removed
from my previous position. I think they suspected I was working
for the West and hoped to get more evidence against me before
they executed me.


    Q. Are British and U.S. intelligence cleansed of Soviet
agents?

    A. The British and American services were, I believe, clean
at the time of my escape. I can't guarantee it, of course,
particularly on the American side, because I don't know the
American side well. But on the British side, I am pretty sure
they remain clean. With the so-called illegals -- KGB officers
using a foreign identity -- it is different. I understand they
were all withdrawn from Britain because of me when I escaped.
But in the 4 1/2 years since, they may have restored that
presence.


    Q. What prompted you to collaborate with the British?

    A. Idealism caused me to do it; I wanted to work for freedom
for my own country too. I had thought about it for a long time.
Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia I said to myself, "I
break with this regime." A few years later I started
collaborating with the British.


    Q. Is the KGB a supporter and protector of Mikhail
Gorbachev's policies?

    A. Yes, it is. I think it is very sad that the Soviet
leadership has to use a huge secret-police organization to
guarantee the program of reforms and some liberalization and
some democratization. In the 1970s and '80s, the KGB was
practically the only uncorrupted agency in the Soviet Union,
a well-disciplined force. As such, it was important to
Gorbachev as an instrument of policy. It was the KGB that from
at least 1984 saw in Gorbachev the only promising candidate
whom it could support and whom it wanted to be the new leader
after the series of elderly and ailing leaders. The KGB felt
the need for reform. It saw the catastrophic situation in the
Soviet Union better than anybody else because it is the
best-informed body in the Soviet Union about internal and
external developments. From the start, Gorbachev asked the KGB
to provide information for the government, an independent,
objective view of the economic, social and political situation.
The KGB remains an important tool for him. It is the only
agency he has not restructured.


    Q. So the KGB still performs its more negative functions?

    A. Yes, the KGB still watches those who are politically
dangerous to the regime, those who are in the political
opposition, those who support nationalist and separatist
tendencies, those who are generally against the communist
system. Sadly, because the KGB is so important to the regime,
to Gorbachev, the negative aspects of the KGB remain intact and
ready to start repression again when the situation might demand
it. Also, the KGB's massive internal espionage continues
unabated. Abroad the KGB has a huge network of intelligence
stations that is not really in proportion to the needs of the
Soviet Union. The fact that the KGB remains intact, working,
recruiting people, collecting information, is, I think, in
contradiction to glasnost and perestroika and to the "new
thinking" that changed and improved Soviet foreign policy. If
the objective is relaxation between East and West, then
espionage should be minimized as well, which is not the case
with the KGB. It is slowly expanding abroad, with a bit more
emphasis on industrial spying. There are more than 100 KGB
agents in Washington and another 100 at least in New York City,
and huge stations in West Germany, France and India, for
example. The KGB still reinforces the prejudices, suspicions
and misconceptions of the Soviet leadership, which remains
paranoid toward the West. This means the KGB still tells the
Soviet leadership and the armed forces that now that the Soviet
Union is getting weaker, the West could resort to an attack.
Nonsense.


    Q. What was your greatest coup as a Western spy?

    A. When I reported to the West that the Brezhnev leadership,
in its profound misconceptions, ignorance and prejudices,
became acutely fearful of a surprise pre-emptive nuclear strike
on learning that the U.S. was developing the Strategic Defense
Initiative. The Brezhnev leadership reckoned that if the U.S.
was to possess strategic superiority, it would certainly stage
a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. This information
helped the West to realize the depth and danger of Moscow's
paranoia.


    Q. Might the KGB find the current disorders in the Soviet
Union too much and act to topple the regime and the
troublemakers?

    A. It is absolutely impossible. The KGB was never
omnipotent. Even if many of its members are unhappy with the
disorder and unhappy that any freedom at all has been granted
in the Soviet Union, it is a well-disciplined organization, and
it follows orders; it is not adventuristic.


    Q. How genuine is the Soviet Communist Party's decision to
renounce its political exclusivity?

    A. I am very skeptical and cautious about it. The party
wants to give the impression that it is not the undisputed
authority, but it still is determined to remain in control of
society, to remain the main force. The party remains deeply
entrenched, deeply rooted in all [government] agencies. There
is no other administration apart from the party. At some time,
potential opposition forces will become political parties and
will fight for some influence. But that will take at least
until the next millennium.


    Q. Is there a chance that the army, worried about the
disturbances in the Soviet Union caused by Gorbachev's reforms,
might intervene to topple him?

    A. I don't think so. The leadership of the army and of the
party are close to each other. And the majority of the officers
do not wish to get involved. There are very few of them who
would want to be in charge of all the mess, to take all the
responsibility for cleaning it up without any guarantee that
they can do it. In the past the Soviet political situation was
predictable; now it is getting less and less predictable. There
are some important people in the party who, because of the
country's chaos, talk about a possible split in the party. If
it comes to that, the army will have to decide whom to pay its
allegiance to, whom to support. Then it cannot entirely be
ruled out that the army will become politically decisive in
which side ends up on top.


    Q. Will Moscow use force against secession by the Baltic
states?

    A. No. There are several reasons. Moscow will not hesitate
to use force in Azerbaijan and similar places. The Caucasus is
strategically very important, and the Soviet leadership is less
concerned about public reaction there. But the Baltics are so
civilized, so connected to the West. All that makes military
intervention there more difficult.


    Q. Do you think the KGB has forgiven you in the new climate
between East and West and within the Soviet Union?

    A. No.


    Q. Will it ever?

    A. No. Never. But I would like to think that now that
Gorbachev has said he wants the Soviet Union to join the family
of civilized nations, he will let my family go free.